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The Duty of Confidentiality
in the Surveillance Age
By Jack Lerner, Michael Frank, Michelle Lee, and Diana Wade
onfidentiality is the cornerstone of the lawyerclient relationship. The duty of confidentiality
helps to build a trusting relationship between
lawyer and client that encourages the client to
be as open with and provide as much information
to his or her lawyer as is necessary for proper representation.1 Confidentiality also is important to the
attorney-client privilege, because the privilege only
protects communications made in confidence.2 This
is why, when a lawyer wants to talk with a client, he
or she must ensure that the only persons listening to
the conversation are members of the legal representation team or other lawyers from the firm, unless the
client has specified otherwise.3
As has been discussed elsewhere,4 the entirely
Internet-based nature of cloud computing complicates the lawyer’s obligation to maintain confidentiality. Recent disclosures about the National Security
Agency’s (NSA) surveillance programs have made
that obligation infinitely more complex. Indeed,
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the documents leaked by Edward Snowden reveal
a surveillance apparatus so pervasive that it raises
fundamental questions about whether lawyers can
maintain confidentiality at all when communicating
electronically. In light of evidence that NSA can
intercept, decrypt, and retain nearly every type of
electronic communication5—and that it intercepts
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The Duty of Confidentiality
from page 1
and retains a massive amount of domestic as well
as foreign communications, sometimes including
attorney-client communications6—attorneys must
now re-evaluate whether the use of cloud service providers can still be in line with the rules of professional
conduct in their jurisdiction. Some attorneys, such
as those working with terrorism suspects, have long
been concerned that NSA surveillance compromises
their ability to uphold their duty of confidentiality;
last year, in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA,
133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013), the Supreme Court rejected
this complaint for lack of standing. In recent months,
however, this issue has received renewed nationwide attention as both The New York Times and The
Nation have reported that the NSA or other agencies
have intercepted and/or listened in on privileged
communications.7
Before the advent of technologies such as cloud
computing, lawyers generally maintained all client
files and information onsite or in physical offsite storage, and were able to manage those files personally
or with the help of a hired professional. This type of
practice generally protected lawyers against breaches
of their duty of confidentiality because access to client files was limited to a select few individuals, and
third parties were excluded.8 All of this has changed
since the arrival of cloud computing, which has not
only impacted the way the legal profession handles
client information but also poses new risks to the
security of confidential data.
In this article, we assess what the NSA’s surveillance practices mean for law practices that use
cloud computing, and we explore what these revelations may mean for the duty of confidentiality
in general. We begin with a review of how cloud
computing works, weighing the relative advantages
and disadvantages of employing an entirely Internetbased system and examining how that differs from
the use of an onsite server. We then analyze the
federal statutes that authorize government surveillance and discuss these laws in light of the newly
revealed NSA practices. We conclude that the
NSA surveillance revelations may have changed
the duty of confidentiality analysis with regard to
electronic communications. The NSA’s collection
authority will partially expire in 20159 and Congress

is currently considering amendments to legislation authorizing surveillance. However, attorneys
with foreign clients or matters concerning national
security should take the precautions recommended
in this article, as the NSA may not be forthcoming
about the scope of its surveillance activity and its
scrutiny of the communications it collects even after
new legislation is enacted.

CLOUD COMPUTING IN LEGAL
P R AC T I C E : A N OV E RV I E W
Cloud computing is a method of storing, managing, and interacting with data on a system operated
online—“in the cloud”—by a third party.10 Cloud
computing has become common in the legal field,
with 31 percent of practicing attorneys reporting
that they use cloud systems in 2013, a 10 percent
increase from 2012.11 The popularity of cloud computing systems is understandable. With a cloud
system, attorneys no longer have to be physically
present in their offices in order to work,12 and can
instead access all of their files from anywhere, using
almost any device.
Cloud computing systems can be more costeffective than traditional storage methods. Traditional
methods require law firms to purchase an onsite server
to store all client information, which often requires
firms to purchase more storage space than they need.13
Cloud systems can solve this problem because a cloud
provider typically will store data from several different
clients (i.e., law firms) on a single server, meaning
that each firm only has to pay for the storage that it
needs.14 Furthermore, cloud computing can reduce
the traditionally high costs of hiring technicians
to maintain servers and other components of an
information technology system.15 Another benefit to
cloud services is that data often is stored on multiple
servers, a process called redundancy. This makes client data less susceptible to destruction as a result of
server failure.16
It is important to distinguish between cloud computing services and traditional non-cloud-based email.
In the latter, emails are stored on private servers but
sent across the Internet (“the cloud”), almost always in
unencrypted form, to another private server. Email services that store emails on the cloud, however, such as
Gmail, are considered cloud computing. In addition,
7
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many individuals and companies maintain their own
email servers, but use cloud-based backup systems.
Despite the clear benefits of cloud computing,
scholars and commentators have raised serious questions about its use in the legal services context.17 One
of the main problems is that, with cloud services,
attorneys have limited control over their clients’
confidential data. In the past, law firms typically
stored all electronic files on an onsite server, meaning that control of the data remained with the firm.
With a cloud computing service, a third party manages the storage of electronic client data and therefore
retains much of the control.18 Further, cloud providers
often hire subcontractors of their own in the storage
and maintenance processes.19 Law firms considering
switching to a cloud system therefore must draft any
service contract or agreement carefully. The contract
or agreement must ensure that the data being managed by the third party provider is not destroyed
or revealed to any unauthorized individuals. But
contractual clauses alone cannot foreclose the possibility that data will be mismanaged or unlawfully
disclosed.20 The cloud provider or any of its subcontractors could suffer from problems that impact a
law firm, such as bankruptcy, acquisition by another
company, or technical problems, any of which could
compromise the stored information.21 In addition,
cloud providers often commingle the data from several different clients on a single server; all the data is
kept together in a unified database and organized only
by queries from the user interface. This technique
creates an additional risk that one client’s data could
be seized or disclosed unintentionally in response to a
subpoena dealing with another client.22
Finally, data storage in the cloud raises jurisdictional issues. The Internet does not exist in a single
location, and thus data stored in the cloud is not
necessarily restricted to a given location. By placing
data in the cloud, lawyers are potentially subjecting
themselves to rules of practice or even lawsuits in foreign states, where they may be subject to unfavorable
venues or privacy laws.23

S TAT E B A R E T H I C A L O P I N I O N S
O N L AW Y E R I N G “ I N T H E C L O U D ”
Even before the recent NSA surveillance revelations, including revelations involving attorney-client
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communications,24 many state bar associations issued
opinions relating to the use of cloud computing services in legal practice.25 A general takeaway from
most of these opinions is that lawyers must exercise
“reasonable care” when choosing to adopt a cloud
service for data storage.26 Some states go even further,
outlining specific requirements that attorneys must
consider before using a cloud. New York is one such
example.27 To exercise “reasonable care” in New York,
an attorney must: (1) ensure that the cloud provider
has an enforceable confidentiality obligation, including a provision that the provider will inform the
attorney if it receives a subpoena for stored information; (2) ensure that the cloud provider has adequate
security and recoverability measures; (3) use technology to safeguard data from “reasonably foreseeable
security breaches”; and (4) understand the provider’s
ability to move and/or delete stored data.28
The Massachusetts State Bar requires an attorney to use “reasonable efforts” to ensure that a cloud
provider’s practices and policies are in line with the
attorney’s ethical duties. The Bar outlines the following requirements. The attorney must: (1) be familiar
with the cloud provider’s policies for handling confidential data; (2) ensure that there can be no unauthorized access to data; (3) ensure that the attorney
has access to and control over stored data should
the relationship between the attorney and the cloud
provider end; (4) ensure that the provider’s policies
will not result in disclosure of confidential information; and (5) ensure that the cloud provider’s policies
are in line with the attorney’s ethical responsibilities. Importantly, Massachusetts also requires client
consent before the attorney may use a cloud system.29
The State Bar of California has released two
comprehensive opinions relating to the use of cloud
systems: (1) addressing the broad issue of confidentiality in the use of technologies that can be accessed
by third parties,30 and (2) addressing whether an
attorney can have a virtual law office (VLO) and still
comply with his or her professional duties.31
In the first opinion, the California Bar determined that using technologies to which third parties
have access is in line with a lawyer’s ethical duties so
long as the lawyer considers certain factors before use.
The first factor is how secure the particular technology
is compared to other technologies, and whether there
are any reasonable precautions that can be taken to
make the technology even more secure. Next, when

8
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a cloud provider or other third party with access to
confidential information can be punished—either
civilly or criminally—for mishandling or unlawfully
disclosing the information contained on their servers,
an attorney should feel safer using that cloud service.
Third, when faced with a decision to use a cloud
system as opposed to a more traditional data storage
system, a lawyer must consider the sensitivity of the
material to be stored; the more sensitive the material,
the less risk a lawyer may take and still be in line with
his or her ethical responsibilities. A lawyer must also
consider the potential impact of disclosure on the
client, as well as the urgency of the situation. Finally,
attorneys in California must closely follow all client
instructions, so if a client instructs against using a
cloud storage system, such a technology should not
be used.32
In the second opinion, the California Bar
addressed the issue of whether an attorney can operate a VLO, which is a system in which “the delivery
of, and payment for, legal services [is] exclusively, or
nearly exclusively, through the law firm’s portal on
a website, where all of the processing, communication, software utilization, and computing will be
Internet-based.”33 The Bar emphasized that the relevant California ethical rules apply equally to VLO
practitioners and non-VLO practitioners, but that
VLO practitioners must take into account additional
considerations, including the credentials of the vendor, how secure data is on the vendor’s servers, where
data is stored and whether it is transmitted across
jurisdictional boundaries, and so on. The opinion also
requires that VLO practitioners take heightened measures to ensure compliance with their duty of competence, such as communicating clearly with the client
to ensure that the client can make informed decisions.34 Certainly, the factors listed in the California
Bar opinion requiring VLOs to follow extra precautions apply to all lawyers using cloud systems.
In addition to the formal bar opinions issued
in California and several other states,35 the law firm
InformationLawGroup has authored a cloud computing “Bill of Rights,” a useful checklist of cloud computing features for which users can bargain in order
to obtain more transparency and reduce the risks that
come with cloud computing services.36
Thus far, our discussion has focused only on potential confidentiality problems posed by the risk that
a third party cloud provider and any subcontractors

might mishandle or disclose confidential information on their servers. An additional concern exists,
however, when the government seeks the confidential
client information stored on a third party cloud server.
Cloud providers routinely receive such requests, and
often must comply without notifying the affected party.

SURVEILLANCE OF ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATIONS—WHAT WE
KNEW, AND WHAT WE NOW KNOW
On June 5, 2013, The Guardian published an order
of the US Foreign Intelligence Security Court (FISA
Court) authorizing indiscriminate collection by the
NSA of Verizon subscribers’ telephone records, regardless of whether they were United States citizens. The
order, leaked by former computer technical and security analyst Edward Snowden,37 was the first of many
revelations that collectively generated a new global
awareness of the United States government’s massive
electronic surveillance operation. While the revelations shocked the public and have spurred a national
conversation about government overreach and the
interplay between privacy and security, it has been well
known for years that the US government conducts
broad electronic surveillance in a variety of contexts.
Client correspondence and data stored on cloud
computing services can be subject to such surveillance
because several statutes grant the government the
power to obtain these “electronic communications,”
often without notification to the affected party. Until
recently, however, the public did not know how NSA
and other government agencies have been interpreting these statutes, nor did the public know what kind
of collection the FISA Court had authorized. The
Snowden disclosures reveal a surveillance apparatus
so comprehensive that it raises doubts about whether
the confidentiality of materials on cloud computing
systems can ever be maintained.

S TAT U T E S AU T H O R I Z I N G
S U RV E I L L A N C E A N D
AC Q U I S I T I O N O F D O M E S T I C
C O M M U N I C AT I O N S
Most lawyers who work in criminal law, international law, or on matters concerning national security
9
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or terrorism know that the Department of Justice
(DOJ) or another law enforcement organization can
obtain a warrant or court order upon the determination that a communication is relevant to a criminal
investigation.38 As for lawyer-client communications,
if the communication or stored information is not
properly protected by the attorney-client privilege,
then law enforcement can request a warrant or court
order to acquire the electronic communications and
stored information.39 Once the provider receives such
a warrant or court order, the provider must comply,
often in secrecy. The DOJ and law enforcement
organizations are therefore essentially able to collect
a wide range cloud computing communications and
information under the broad language and flexible
constraints of the relevant statutes.40
The Stored Communications Act (SCA) requires
a conventional warrant upon probable cause for communications stored in an “electronic communications
system” for less than 180 days.41 But for communications older than 180 days stored on a “remote computing service,”42 the government needs something
less than a warrant upon probable cause, and instead
may obtain a subpoena upon showing “specific and
articulable facts” that there are “reasonable grounds”
to believe that the contents of a communication or
a record are “relevant and material” to an ongoing
criminal investigation.43 The service provider may
not notify the subscriber, and is shielded from liability from any lawsuits brought by the subscriber for
complying with the disclosure order.44 Even under
a “specific and articulable facts” court order, often
called a “2703(d)” order, notice to the subscriber
may be delayed by up to 90 days if disclosure would
be adverse to the investigation.45 Although the SCA
does allow a service provider to petition to set aside
an order compelling disclosure if it is unduly burdensome, the provider cannot notify the subscriber of the
petition.46
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(ECPA) provides that a court may issue a warrant
authorizing interception of wire and electronic communications if the government agent provides an
application showing probable cause. The application
is more strenuous than a conventional warrant application, requiring “a full and complete statement” as to
whether other investigative procedures have failed or
are reasonably unlikely to succeed or be too dangerous, a statement of the period of time of the requested
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interception, a statement of previous applications,
and, if requesting an extension, an explanation for
why the current interception failed to obtain results.47
Additionally, under the Pen Register Act,48 an
attorney for the government or a state law enforcement or investigative officer can obtain an order
requiring an electronic service provider to install pen
registers or trap and trace devices.49 The government
cannot use pen registers and trap and trace devices
to record or capture the contents of any communications under surveillance.50 In order to obtain such an
order, the government attorney or officer needs to
certify that “the information likely to be obtained by
such installation and use is relevant to an ongoing
criminal investigation.”51 If the judge grants the order,
the government can use either device for up to 60
days and request a renewal. The service provider must
comply with the government in the installation and
use of the device under strict secrecy and with minimum of interference with the subscriber’s services.52
Because the judge reviews the order ex parte, the subscriber or service provider cannot contest the installation beforehand. Given the requirements prohibiting
disclosure, there is no way for the subscriber to know
if information relating to his or her communications
is being monitored. This is problematic for attorneys,
especially with respect to the use of emails, because
dialing, routing addressing, or signaling information
can reveal much about the identity and the location
of the source, potentially undermining the confidentiality of those communications.
The surveillance authorized under these statues
means that a lawyer could potentially violate the
duty to maintain the confidentiality of client communications by failing to exercise proper care with
respect to selection of a cloud computing service.
The InformationLawGroup’s “Bill of Rights” recommends that attorneys seek contractual provisions with
a cloud computing provider and its subcontractors
guaranteeing that they will fight such government
requests and will seek to have them disclosed.53 Even
such contractual provisions do not provide much
protection, however, given the minimal showing
required of the government and the secrecy that the
statutes authorize.
The US Attorneys’ Manual encourages prosecutors to respect the attorney-client privilege when
seeking warrants and subpoenas and conducting
searches.54 However, the guidelines do not create
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any enforceable right nor do “they place any limitations on otherwise lawful investigative or litigative
prerogatives of the Department of Justice.”55 Further,
the DOJ reserves the right to determine which communications are not privileged and then seize those
communications.56 If confidential information is
commingled with other material on a cloud computing service,57 the DOJ may not differentiate between
the two and may seize the confidential information.
The DOJ could conceivably choose not to respect
assertions of the attorney-client privilege, deeming
the requirements for the privilege unmet because the
alleged confidential information was stored in the
same location as non-confidential material without
any extra security measures. In any event, as a practical matter, it may be difficult for either the cloud
provider or the DOJ to separate out commingled data.
These statutes force attorneys to evaluate their
cloud computing usage carefully so as not to violate
their duties of confidentiality and competency. If a
client would be harmed by the government’s acquisition of confidential information, then putting such
information on a cloud puts the client at risk. Again,
a good contract with the cloud provider may provide
some protection, but the cloud provider still cannot
disclose that it is petitioning to set aside or modify an
order from the government if such an order issues.58
Keeping the data storage onsite provides far greater
protection.

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCER E L AT E D S U RV E I L L A N C E
Congress has granted various federal agencies
the authority to conduct wide-ranging surveillance
of communications relating to foreign intelligence or
national security. Under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) and the FISA
Amendment Act of 2008 (FAA), the Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism
Act (USA PATRIOT Act), and statutes authorizing
the issuance of National Security Letters (NSLs),59
the National Security Agency and sometimes other
agencies can obtain or monitor data from cloud
platforms. As is discussed below, at the very least,
lawyers working with international clients, or clients
who may have some connection to foreign matters of

possible interest to the United States, should become
familiar with these statutes, and the surveillance
activities of the NSA.
The law that authorizes the issuance of NSLs
allows the FBI to obtain customer records without a
court order60 when the government deems that a record
is “relevant to an authorized investigation to protect
against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.”61 With an NSL, the FBI may obtain
“subscriber information and toll billing records information, or electronic communication transactional
records.” Service providers must adhere to strict restrictions against disclosure of the receipt of an NSL.62 The
service provider may petition to modify or set aside
an NSL, but courts can only grant such a request only
upon a showing that there is “no reason to believe that
disclosure may endanger the national security of the
United States” or a criminal investigation.63 If the FBI
or the DOJ certifies that disclosure would endanger
national security or interfere with an investigation, the
certification is “conclusive unless the court finds that
the certification was made in bad faith.”64
In March 2013, the US District Court for the
Northern District of California found the nondisclosure restrictions in Section 2709(c) unconstitutional
on First Amendment grounds. The restrictions on
judicial review under Section 3511(b) also were held
to be unconstitutional on First Amendment and separation of powers grounds because the statute “impermissibly attempts to circumscribe a court’s ability to
review the necessity of nondisclosure orders.”65 The
order was stayed to allow the government to appeal,
which it did on May 6, 2013. There had been no
decision as of April 11, 2014, when this article went
to press.66
Despite this decision, issuance of NSLs remains
an ongoing practice.67 Indeed, the FBI has issued tens
of thousands of NSLs since 2001.68 This information
should make lawyers whose practices involve national
security issues think twice before deciding whether
to put client information onto a cloud computing
system. The nondisclosure restrictions enforced upon
electronic communication service providers dictate
that, as a subscriber of a cloud system, a lawyer will
have no way of knowing if the cloud computing
provider receives an NSL and if the government has
acquired the confidential information.
Since 1978, FISA has authorized the Attorney
General and the Director of National Intelligence
11
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to monitor electronic communications containing
foreign intelligence information under 50 U.S.C
§§ 1801 et seq. FISA gives the government wide
discretion to determine what information is relevant
and what communications constitute “foreign intelligence information,” thus giving it broad leeway when
monitoring private conversations.69 FISA authorizes
electronic surveillance upon a showing of probable
cause that the target is “a foreign power or an agent of
a foreign power” and that the facilities at which surveillance is directed is being used or about to be used
by “a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.”70
Further, minimization procedures must be in place to
prevent the acquisition, retention, and dissemination
of “nonpublically available information concerning
unconsenting United States persons.”71
The USA PATRIOT ACT further broadened
the scope of the government’s surveillance powers
by targeting domestic communications of US persons. Section 215,72 commonly called the “business
records” provision, authorizes the FBI to obtain “tangible things” from US persons under strict secrecy if
“presumptively relevant to an authorized investigation” to obtain “foreign intelligence information” or
“to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.”73 As discussed further
below, the FISA Court’s interpretation of “tangible
things” has broadened beyond “books, records, papers,
documents, and other items” to encompass telephone
call records, also known as “telephony metadata.”74
In response to the complaints about warrantless wiretapping during the George W. Bush
Administration, Congress passed the FAA to permit
electronic surveillance along with procedural minimization safeguards to protect domestic communications.75 The government has statutory authority
to monitor electronic communications stored or
accessed through a cloud computing service under
FAA as long as the Attorney General or the Director
of National Intelligence demonstrates to the FISA
Court that minimization procedures are in place.76
Such procedures must aim to collect a minimal
amount of communications from unconsenting US
persons, keep such private communications from the
public, and only collect and retain communications
to the extent that it is consistent with the government’s need to manage foreign intelligence information.77 Yet, as we discuss below, documents leaked
by Snowden reveal that minimization procedures
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approved by the FISA Court have allowed many
domestic communications to be swept up in surveillance activities by the NSA, even attorney-client
privileged communications.78
Under Section 702 of the FAA,79 the Attorney
General and the Director of National Intelligence
have the authority to order an electronic communication service provider to “immediately provide the
Government with all information, facilities, or assistance necessary to accomplish the acquisition” of electronic communications and to prohibit the provider
from notifying the involved parties.80 As long as the
government (1) either receives approval of certification from the FISA Court or determines that exigent
circumstances require immediate implementation of
surveillance, and (2) none of the communications
intentionally target US persons or communications
within the United States, electronic communications81 can be targeted without notification to the
subscribers of electronic communication services.82
The service provider must facilitate the government’s
electronic surveillance of a subscriber’s electronic
communications under strict secrecy and with minimum interference of service to the subscriber.83
Additionally, under Section 703 of the FAA, the
FISA Court may permit the targeting of electronic
communications of a US person reasonably believed
to be located outside the United States. This provision permits the NSA to conduct electronic surveillance or acquire stored electronic communications or
data.84 Again, the electronic service provider must
comply under secrecy.85
Even before the Snowden disclosures, we knew
that the NSA’s surveillance activities were extensive.
Accordingly, many lawyers working with international clients or on international matters were already
concerned about such activities. In 2005, the New
York Times revealed that AT&T had permitted the
NSA to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance
of private communications by allowing it to put splitters in AT&T cables.86 The Snowden revelations are
significant because they reveal that the NSA and the
FISA Court are broadly interpreting the FAA and
the PATRIOT Act to authorize the NSA to monitor electronic communications that experts and the
public alike had presumed were not susceptible to surveillance under those Acts. Such revelations should
be an impetus to rethink the ramifications of putting
confidential communications and data in the cloud.

12
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The Snowden documents reveal that the NSA
has been acquiring massive amounts of domestic
Internet and communications metadata, in addition to many communications themselves. At least
from 2007 to 2011, domestic Internet metadata was
collected under the principle that no reasonable
expectation of privacy exists with regard to metadata,
and that therefore Fourth Amendment protections
were not applicable.87 We also can assume that the
NSA can access the metadata of emails and other
communications processed by cloud computing services. Lawyers with the ACLU have expressed deep
concern over the collection of metadata, claiming
that the context of a phone call can be gleaned from
simple indicators such as the time of the call and the
location of the callers, and therefore argue that such
data is confidential.88
The Verizon Court Order issued by the FISA
Court in 2013 reveals that the NSA is collecting the
domestic telephony metadata of Verizon subscribers pursuant to Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT
ACT.89 That provision authorizes the acquisition of
“tangible things” “presumptively relevant to an authorized investigation” “against international terrorism
or clandestine intelligence activities.”90 The Wall
Street Journal reports that the FISA Court is interpreting “relevant” under that section as anything potentially relevant to national security,91 and the FISA
Court also appears to have concluded that telephony
metadata constitutes a “tangible thing” under Section
215.92 The government has since admitted that the
NSA is collecting virtually all domestic telephony
metadata.93 These revelations suggest that the FISA
Court also could be interpreting Internet metadata
as a “tangible thing” and authorizing applications for
the acquisition of such metadata under Section 215.
If so, the FBI and the DOJ would have another means
by which to obtain electronic metadata stored or
accessed on cloud computing services.
The Snowden documents further reveal that the
NSA also has been acquiring electronic communications by tapping fiber optic cables and interfering
with encryption standards. Documents provided to
The Guardian reveal that GCHQ, the UK’s version
of the NSA, is tapping fiber optic cables and sharing
information with the NSA.94 The Washington Post
has reported that the US government has developed
security agreements with foreign telecommunications companies, buying US fiber optic networks

that allow the government unrestricted access to the
cables.95 Given that data processed on cloud computing systems can be routed to various servers across
the world, client information could be accessed if it
flows through such cables. Further, documents reveal
that the NSA and GCHQ have been secretly tapping into Google and Yahoo’s fiber cable data hubs,
enabling the agencies to collect hundred of millions
of communications.96
The revelations do not stop there. According to
The Guardian, the NSA has been systematically working to undermine encryption used to protect emails,
banking and medical records by inserting “secret
vulnerabilities—known as backdoors or trapdoors—
into commercial encryption software.”97 The government also has demanded encryption keys from at least
one service provider. In June 2013, the FBI ordered
Ladar Levinson, the founder of Lavabit, the email
system used by Snowden, to turn over all of Lavabit’s
encryption keys so that the government could unlock
Snowden’s email. Yet those keys also would have
unlocked the emails of all 400,000 Lavabit users.98
Levinson resisted for two days and then complied
after shutting down Lavabit. Declassified court documents reveal that Levinson complied with requests
for subscriber information in the past, suggesting
that we may no longer be able to trust encryption as
a means to ensure privacy and security of electronic
communications. Naturally, these revelations complicate the analysis that previous bar opinions on cloud
computing require.
Finally, some of the Snowden documents suggest
that the NSA’s prior minimization procedures have
been largely unsuccessful in separating domestic and
foreign communications.99 A set of minimization
procedures signed by Attorney General Eric Holder
reveals that, at least in 2009, the NSA was acquiring
and retaining many domestic communications, and
that there were many exceptions to the minimization
procedures. For example:
•

•

The procedures give NSA discretion to depart
from minimization procedures in order to protect
against immediate threat to national security or
human life.100
Acquired domestic communications are retained
for up to five years and may be forwarded to
analytic personnel for producing intelligence
information from the data.101
13
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•
•

•

All encrypted communications are retained for
up to five years.102
The NSA can forward information to foreign governments, the FBI, and the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA).103
Communications regarding a criminal indictment between a client and an attorney are to be
considered privileged, but not communications
related to foreign intelligence information. In
addition, the DOJ does not consider attorneyclient communications regarding civil matters,
apparently including international trade negotiations,104 to be privileged.105

In addition to purposeful surveillance, The
Washington Post reports that an internal NSA audit
from 2012 reveals that the NSA “has broken privacy
rules or overstepped its authority thousands of times
each year” since 2008 and that “[m]ost of the infractions involve unauthorized surveillance of American
or foreign intelligence targets in the United States[,]”
ranging from “significant violations in the law to
typographical errors.”106

S I G N I F I C A N T I M P L I C AT I O N S
FOR CLOUD COMPUTING
Of all the Snowden revelations, we have identified three that should significantly change how
attorneys should think about the ethics of cloud
computing.
First, we now know that the NSA has the power to
collect an incredibly wide range of communications, is
interpreting this power broadly, and is collecting vast
amounts of domestic communications—including
some attorney-client privileged communications.107
Essentially, the NSA targets any communications
presumed to have been made outside the United
States and by non-US persons if found relevant
to foreign intelligence information.108 As leaked
documents show, the FISA Court, NSA, and DOJ
have been interpreting the relevant statutes very
broadly.
This broad collection has special implications
for lawyers who deal with international clients or
international matters, such as matters concerning
national security or allegations relating to terrorism.
In addition, the entirely online nature of a cloud
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system also means that stored communications and
metadata are much more susceptible to NSA interception than information stored in an onsite server.
Attorneys who have foreign clients, conduct communications abroad, or have matters that could be
found relevant to “foreign intelligence information”
should seriously reconsider whether to utilize cloud
services in light of these revelations. A recent article
in The New York Times revealed that Australia’s intelligence program sought guidance from the N.S.A. on
conducting surveillance on communications between
the Indonesian government and an American law
firm.109 This revelation suggests that attorneys communicating about issues of economic importance to
the US government, such as trade practices with
foreign nations, will need to consider the possibility
that the government will conduct surveillance of
such communications.110
Second, we now know that minimization procedures do not segregate communications with a finemesh sieve. Leaked documents such as the NSA audit
demonstrate that many domestic communications are
inadvertently swept up during surveillance. The NSA
retains these communications for up to five years
and sometimes passes them along to the CIA or the
FBI. According to leaked minimization procedures,
in 2009 the NSA also was collecting some domestic
communications.111 The procedures revealed that the
NSA was authorized to presume that communications
were foreign if there was any doubt about the origin
of those communications or if the NSA analyst was
at least 51 percent sure that one of the conversants
was a non-US person.112 In addition, we have learned
that the NSA has been giving the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) and the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) tips based on intelligence learned from
retained communications, and the DEA and the IRS
do not disclose the NSA as the source of the information.113 Further, if the NSA determines that it has the
authority to review the acquired data, it may keep it,
if such communications are deemed to be of potential
relevance to foreign intelligence information at some
future point. Finally, while the 2009 minimization
procedures mandate that privileged communications
in a criminal case be segregated, there was no similar
restraint for civil matters.114 Accordingly, attorneys who
use a cloud system when communicating with clients
may be putting their clients at risk of government
surveillance, especially if the client had retained the

14
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2585643

April

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N E T L AW

2014

attorney for a civil matter. And criminal attorneys
should be aware that, on occasion, federal agencies
get tips gleaned from NSA surveillance.
Third, we now know that encryption is not
as secure as originally thought. The leaked 2009
minimization procedures indicate that, at least at that
time, the NSA was retaining all encrypted foreign
communications and, alarmingly, even encrypted
domestic communications, for up to five years. This
practice, combined with the NSA’s newly revealed
efforts to undermine or break common Internet
encryption standards suggests that encryption may no
longer be a valid security measure.

CAN CLOUD COMPUTING
S E RV I C E S S T I L L B E U S E D A F T E R
T H E S E R E V E L AT I O N S ?
We’ve long known that law enforcement agencies
can monitor electronic communications and metadata in a variety of ways, such as with a warrant upon
probable cause or under varying standards set forth in
ECPA, the SCA, and the NSL statutes.115 It also has
long been true that the government’s ability to monitor
attorney-client privileged communications generally
has been restricted as a matter of practice. Against
this backdrop, the American Bar Association (ABA)
and various state bar associations generally have determined that using a cloud service is ethical as long as the
attorney conducts his or her due diligence and exercises reasonable care in choosing a service provider.
We now know, however, that the federal government is routinely collecting an astonishing range of
information. In light of the Snowden disclosures and
subsequent reporting and declassifications, it is now
safe to assume that the government is collecting the
following: nearly all domestic telephony metadata
(and large amounts of domestic Internet metadata);116
millions of domestic communications;117 nearly all
electronic communications with non-US persons;118
and millions of encrypted communications.119 We
can no longer assume that security measures such as
encryption protect against such surveillance. Broad
government access to these communications was
once the occasional event; now, it is seems that it
is closer to the norm. In this brave new world, can
a lawyer use cloud systems, or even email for that
matter, and still adhere to the duty of confidentiality?

DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY
RESTS ON REASONABLE
E X P E C TAT I O N O F P R I VAC Y
The question of whether an attorney has fulfilled
his or her duty of confidentiality rests heavily upon
the question of whether the attorney had a “reasonable expectation of privacy,” a principle that has its
roots in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. In his
concurrence in Katz v. United States, Justice Harlan
posited that a “reasonable expectation of privacy”
exists when one has a subjective expectation of privacy, and society is willing to recognize that expectation.120 In the Fourth Amendment context, the
Supreme Court has since adopted Justice Harlan’s test
for determining whether a “reasonable expectation
privacy exists” in communications, and thus, whether
a warrant is necessary to obtain records of such communications or conduct surveillance.121
In United States v. Warshak, the Sixth Circuit
held that a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in
emails is not extinguished by a third party intermediary’s “mere ability” or right to access those communications.122 The court found that users subjectively
expect privacy in email communications and that
society is willing to recognize such an expectation.123
Along similar lines, many state bars have determined
that the Fourth Amendment “reasonable expectation of privacy” standard applies to email and that
an attorney’s use of unencrypted email transmitted
through several ISPs does not violate the duty of confidentiality as long as the attorney takes reasonable
steps to protect the communications from disclosure
to third parties.124
The problem with the Snowden revelations is
that they threaten to vitiate any subjective “reasonable expectation of privacy” with regard to wide
swaths of email communications and cloud computing. If attorneys are aware of the NSA’s broad sweeping data collection effort—as they should be, given
that they must “keep abreast of changes in the law
and its practice”125—can attorneys still assert a subjective expectation that electronic communications
are confidential? If the NSA surveillance revelations undermine an attorney’s subjective expectation
that his or her communications are private, the
attorney is violating the letter of most bars’ rules
setting forth the duty of confidentiality. This is what
Amnesty International argued in Clapper v. Amnesty
15
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International USA, relying in part on an expert declaration from legal ethics expert Professor Stephen
Gillers. Amnesty argued that continuing to use
electronic communications when attorneys “believe
that their electronic communications will likely be
monitored” is “violat[ing] ethical rules and expos[ing]
themselves to possible bar discipline.”126
Post-Snowden, the ethical quandary is even
more far-reaching: If key aspects of nearly all communications are being retained and are subject to
surveillance at the whim of the government, how can
attorneys ethically use electronic communications at
all? In answering this question, perhaps we can make a
distinction between communications that the lawyer
reasonably expects will be subject to surveillance such
as correspondence with a terrorism suspect, and purely
domestic communications that have no criminal law
component and the lawyer presumes would not be
of interest to government entities. But the Snowden
revelations make that distinction fuzzy at best, as the
New York Times’s reporting about the government’s
possible surveillance of Mayer Brown, a law firm
working with the Indonesian government on trade
issues, makes clear.127 In our view, the NSA surveillance programs and their porous protections for largeclient communications make it extremely hard for
attorneys with certain practices to honor the duty of
confidentiality—those touching on national security,
terrorism, foreign relations, or international economic
issues, for example. But where does that group end and
the rest of the legal profession begin? We know of no
reliable rubric by which to determine whether one is
a target; indeed, in a system in which vast amounts of
data are intercepted and retained in case they may be
of interest at a later time, that may be impossible to do.
Does that mean that no attorney can now ethically
use electronic communications? These are uncharted
waters, and lawyers must tread carefully. But we think
that given the impracticability of eliminating electronic communications with one’s clients in today’s
increasingly online environment, it is unlikely that
courts and state bars will interpret the Snowden revelations to mean that no one can now use electronic
communications and cloud storage. In fact, one court
has held that, even if an individual suspected NSA surveillance and acted accordingly,128 such an individual
could still have a reasonable expectation of privacy.129
Clearly, however, attorneys who harbor any
reasonable suspicion that their communications may
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be of interest to the NSA or law enforcement, now
have a heightened duty to protect the confidentiality
of privileged materials. And cases such as Amnesty
International v. Clapper and ACLU v. NSA,130 which
dismissed for lack of standing attorneys’ arguments
that they couldn’t do their work because they suspected that they were under surveillance, likely no
longer apply. The revelation that the NSA shares
information gleaned from its surveillance with agencies such as the DEA and the FBI, and to other countries, only underscores that conclusion.

A P P LY I N G T H E P R E V I O U S
G U I DA N C E F R O M S TAT E B A R S
It is now clear that for an attorney to adhere to
his or her the duty of confidentiality while continuing to use electronic communications, he or she must
thoroughly consult the applicable statutes and professional codes of conduct and make careful choices in
choosing a service provider, considering especially
the available security measures. While the courts
have analyzed reasonable expectation of privacy in
a piecemeal fashion, various state bars have analyzed
the ethics of cloud computing more comprehensively.
We now turn to that analysis.
Take, for example, California Business &
Professional Code § 6068, which states that an attorney must “maintain inviolate the confidence, and at
every peril to himself or herself to preserve the secrets
of his or her client,” and the attorney only may reveal
information to prevent a criminal act that would
result in death or serious bodily harm to an individual. Because of this strict wording, an attorney must
take every step possible to preserve the confidence
of privileged client communications. Given that we
know the NSA has been monitoring domestic communications, attorneys in California who put client
communications onto electronic systems arguably are
not “maintain[ing] inviolate” the confidentiality of
said communications. The comments to California
Rule of Professional Conduct 3.100, however, allow
an attorney to reveal confidential information if the
client has given informed consent.131 At a minimum,
attorneys practicing in California should not use
cloud services for client communication without
first obtaining informed consent from the client. It
is essential, however, that California attorneys still
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proceed with caution, even after receiving informed
consent from the client.
Under the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, the analysis is slightly different. Rule 1.6(a)
allows an attorney to reveal confidential information
if the client gives informed consent. But Rule 1.6(c)
is less restrictive than the equivalent California rule,
because it instructs an attorney to make “reasonable
efforts” to prevent “inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of … information relating to the representation of a
client.” Under these provisions, using a cloud system for
client communications may be an ethical practice, if the
measures the attorney takes to secure his or her client’s
data are reasonable. Such measures may include the use
of encrypting and considering the likelihood of inadvertent disclosure, the harm to the client if the information
is disclosed, and the sensitivity of the information.132
Thus, even though the NSA is monitoring metadata,
foreign communications, and much more, it may be
that the monitoring presents little real risk of harm
to the client. In any event, the attorney can obtain
informed consent from his or her client about the risk
of government surveillance and, with that consent, may
still be able to ethically continue use of a cloud service.
The NSA revelations also change how lawyers
should evaluate different cloud services. For example,
in 2010 the New York State Bar emphasized that a
“lawyer should periodically reconfirm that [a] provider’s
security measures remain effective in light of advances
in technology.” Because we now know that encryption
is not necessarily an effective means against disclosure,
using a cloud service in New York could conceivably
no longer be in line with an attorney’s ethical duties.133
These revelations likely have a similar impact on
attorneys practicing in Massachusetts. To qualify as
taking “reasonable efforts” in Massachusetts, an attorney must look at a cloud provider’s existing practices
“to reasonably ensure that data stored on the provider’s
system actually will remain confidential, and will not
be intentionally or inadvertently disclosed or lost.”134
If encryption is no longer effective against intentional
or inadvertent disclosure, cloud systems could conceivably no longer be ethical in Massachusetts atleast
without informed consent.135
The California State Bar’s Formal Opinion No.
2010-179 contains similar guidance. That opinion
instructed that if a lawyer were to use a public wireless
connection, the attorney would “ris[k] violating his
duties of confidentiality and competence … unless he

takes appropriate precautions, such as using a combination of file encryption, encryption of wireless transmissions and a personal firewall.”136 However, if the
attorney uses wireless connections entirely to access
his or her cloud systems and it is known that the
NSA can break Internet encryption, the precautions
become useless. Thus cloud computing—along with
sending emails and making phone calls abroad—could
conceivably no longer meet the standard of the 2010179 opinion that requires an attorney to reasonably
believe the communications to be confidential.137 The
NSA’s aggressive decryption activity is just the type of
technological and security change that requires the
attorney to re-evaluate his or her use of a cloud system.
At this juncture, the decision to adopt cloud
computing or continue using electronic forms of communications still rests heavily on the attorney’s own
judgment. The attorney must complete the objective
and subjective “reasonable expectation of privacy”
analysis and then conduct additional analysis regarding security and confidentiality of communications as
laid out in the Model Rules and state bar opinions.
The attorney must consider the sensitivity of the client’s identity, geographic location, nationality, and
legal needs as the analysis will depend heavily on
these factors,138 and in most if not all cases, obtain
informed consent from his or her client. In addition
the attorney must get to know the technology, carefully negotiate contracts with cloud providers, and
use encryption at every turn. If the attorney has done
so, in many cases he or she can use email and cloud
computing services and still adhere to the duties of
confidentiality and competency.
All of that may change as we continue to learn
more about the extent of the NSA’s activities and that
of its partners around the world and as the reasonable
expectation of privacy jurisprudence develops.

CONCLUSION
The NSA surveillance revelations require attorneys to re-evaluate the security of communications over
the Internet and “in the cloud.” With the newly discovered practices of the NSA, there are questions as to
whether the conclusions of the previous state bar opinions that approved of cloud computing are still controlling. In our view, while some attorneys may be able to
adopt cloud computing and still adhere to their duties
17
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of confidentiality and competency, many attorneys will,
and should, decide not to use cloud computing. In some
cases, a subjective belief of confidentiality simply cannot be held in good faith in light of NSA surveillance
practices. For this reason, at the very least, attorneys
always should obtain informed consent from their clients before using cloud services. After the attorney has
done so, he or she must then take reasonable measures
to protect these communications and information to
fully adhere to his or her duty of confidentiality. Either
way, whether an attorney is ethical in adopting cloud
computing rests heavily on the individual, fact-specific
factors, and the attorney’s judgment.
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